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Cromwell: Cromwell: Arbitration and Its Collateral

Arbitration and Its Collateral
Estoppel Effect on Third Parties
Vandenberg v. Superior Court'

I. INTRODUCTION
Collateral estoppel is a theory of res judicata, which precludes the relitigation
of an issue already decided in prior litigation. However, should judicially confirmed
arbitration awards be given the same effect as traditional litigation for the sake of
applying collateral estoppel to a controversy involving a third party? As arbitration
becomes a more utilized form of dispute resolution, the benefits of applying
collateral estoppel to arbitration awards could be plentiful. Most courts have
recognized such benefits and, therefore, most jurisdictions in the United States have
ruled that collateral estoppel applies to judicially confirmed arbitration decisions.
However, California's supreme court has bucked this prevailing trend and ruled that
arbitration proceedings should not have the power to bind third parties in future
controversies involving the same issue.
This Note examines why California's supreme court chose not to allow
judicially confirmed arbitration awards to apply to third parties. The court based its
decision on the contract model of arbitration and determined that an agreement to
arbitrate was not necessarily an agreement binding third parties. However, this
decision undermines the credibility of the arbitration process and fails to consider the
negative impact relitigation of issues will have on the California courts.

II. FACTS AND HOLDING
From 1958 to 1988 Vandenberg Motors, Inc. ("Vandenberg") operated an
automobile sales and service business on property leased from Eugene and Kathryn
Boyd ("Boyd"). 2 In 1988, Vandenberg ceased its operations and the leased property
reverted to Boyd.3 In preparing to sell the property, Boyd removed three waste oil
storage tanks that were allegedly installed on the property and operated by
Vandenberg.4 It was then determined that the soil and groundwater had been
contaminated by a petroleum-based pollutant.' Boyd filed suit against Vandenberg
on numerous grounds related to the contamination of the property by the oil tanks.6

1. 982 P.2d 229 (Cal. 1999).
2. Id. at 234. Eugene Boyd died during the preceding litigation, therefore, the Boyds' interests are
subsequently referred to in the singular. Id. at 235.
3. Id.
4. Id.
5. Id. at 234-35.
6. Id. at 235. Boyd filed an action against Vandenberg alleging causes of action for breach of
contract, breach of the covenant of good faith and fair dealing, public and private nuisance, negligence,
waste, trespass, strict liability, equitable indemnity, declaratory relief, and injunctive relief. Id.
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Vandenberg referred the suit to its several insurance providers, but United States
Fidelity and Guaranty Company ("USF & G"), with whom Vandenberg had a
general commercial liability policy, was the only insurer who agreed to defend the
Boyd suit.' However, the policies provided by USF & G and the other insurers had
pollution exclusions, which exempted the insurance companies from covering any
'
property damage caused by a pollutant that was not "sudden and accidental."
As part of a settlement agreement, Vandenberg and Boyd consented to binding
9
arbitration and USF & G agreed to defend Vandenberg in that proceeding.
However, USF & G and Vandenberg did not resolve the issue of whether the
0
insurance policy would cover any potential liability on the part of Vandenberg.'
Boyd
and
Vandenberg was found negligent in the binding arbitration proceeding,
was awarded four million dollars for the damage caused to the property."
Furthermore, the arbitrator concluded that the contamination was not "sudden or
accidental."' 2
Vandenberg sought indemnification from its insurers after the ruling in favor of
Boyd, but the claims were rejected.' 3 Vandenberg then sued its insurers for their
failure to indemnify. 4 In response, the group of insurers filed motions for summary
adjudication.' 5 In one of the motions, USF & G and Centennial stated that they had
neither a duty to defend nor a duty to indemnify because their policies' pollution
exclusion clauses were activated when the arbitrator's findings determined that the
contamination was not "sudden and accidental."' 6 The two insurers claimed that the
not be
issue of whether the contamination was "sudden and accidental" could
17
litigated again because the issue was precluded by collateral estoppel.
The trial court granted the motion for summary adjudication on the basis of
collateral estoppel." However, the California Court of Appeal reversed the summary
adjudication order holding that private arbitration does not bar relitigating an issue
19
when the relitigation involves a different party and different causes of action. In
the
California
a decision contrary to the prevailing opinion of other jurisdictions,
Supreme Court affirmed the appellate court's decision and issued a narrow holding
that "a private arbitration award cannot have nonmutual collateral estoppel effect
unless the arbitral parties so agree." 20

7. Id. Vandenberg also had general commercial liability policies with Phoenix Assurance Company
of New York, the Glens Falls Insurance Company, Continental Insurance Company, TIG Insurance
Corporation, and Centennial Insurance Company. Id.
8. Id.
9. Id.
10. Id.
11. Id.
12. Id.
13. Id.
14. Id.
15. Id.
16. Id. A second motion for summary adjudication, filed by all of the insurers, claimed that the
general commercial liability did not apply to Vandenberg because the arbitrator awarded damages on
the grounds of breach of lease. Id.
17. Id. at 235-36.
18. Id. The trial court also granted the second motion for summary adjudication. Id.
19. Id.
20. Id. at 242-43.
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III. LEGAL BACKGROUND
Collateral estoppel is a subset of the doctrine of res judicata, which precludes
parties from relitigating an issue that has already been determined by a court.2 Res
judicata is deemed to have a high public policy value because it keeps parties from
being pulled back into a controversy after they have already litigated the issue to a
fair conclusion. 22 Under collateral estoppel, a party to prior litigation may be
precluded from relitigating issues that were already decided against that party.23
integrity, preserve limited judicial
Collateral estoppel is designed to maintain judicial
24
resources, and prevent harassing litigation.
The only requirements by California courts for the application of collateral
estoppel are that: (1) the issue being precluded is identical to the previously decided
issue, (2) the issue must have been litigated in the prior preceding, (3) the former
decision must have been final and based on the merits, and (4) the party against
whom collateral estoppel is sought must have been directly involved in the preceding
litigation. 25 Thus, collateral estoppel can be nonmutual and a party seeking to
enforce it may not have been a party in the original litigation.26
However, despite the fairly simple requirements for collateral estoppel,
California courts have ruled that this is not an inflexible, universally applied
principle." Instead, each court must weigh the policy considerations when
determining whether to apply collateral estoppel."8 A court may choose not to apply
collateral estoppel in cases where the benefits of enforcing it are outweighed by
other specific factors present in a particular case.29 One issue that courts often
consider in determining whether to apply collateral estoppel is the judicial integrity
of the forum which first decided the issue.30 For instance, in Sanderson v. Nieman,
the California Supreme Court held that decisions from small claims court were not
given the effect of collateral estoppel because, of the informal nature of the
proceeding and the limited possibility of judicial review.3'
Courts have acknowledged, however, that certain pitfalls exist within the
doctrine of collateral estoppel.3 2 In Kelly v. Trans Globe Travel Bureau, Inc., the
California Court of Appeal noted that collateral estoppel can skew the weight of a
judicial proceeding because the outcome may have a disproportionate impact on one
of the parties due to possible outside litigation.33 In ParklaneHosiery Co. v. Shore,34
the United States Supreme Court was concerned that "[i]f a defendant in the first

21.
22.
23.
24.
25.
26.
27.
28.
29.
30.
31.
32.
33.

Bernhard v. Bank of Am.,. 19 Cal. 2d 807, 810 (1942).
Id. at 811.
Vandenberg, 982 P.2d at 236.
Lucido v. Superior Court, 795 P.2d 1223, 1227 (Cal. 1990).
Id. at 1225.
Vandenberg, 982 P.2d at 236.
Kelly v. Trans Globe Travel Bureau, Inc., 60 Cal. App. 3d 195, 202 (1976).
Id. See also Lucido, 795 P.2d at 1226.
Jackson v. City of Sacramento, 117 Cal. App. 3d 596, 603. (1981).
Vandenberg, 982 P.2d at 237.
17 Cal. 2d 563 (1941).
Kelly, 60 Cal. App. 3d at 202.
Id.

34. 439 U.S. 322 (1979).
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action is sued for small or nominal damages, he may have little incentive to defend
vigorously, particularly if future suits are not foreseeable.""
With courts expressing concerns over the application and ramifications of
collateral estoppel in judicial proceedings, courts would understandably apply even
greater scrutiny to collateral estoppel of private arbitration decisions. In California,
Title IX of the California Code of Civil Procedure governs private arbitration.36
Through these statutory enactments, the California legislature has expressed a
"strong public policy in favor of arbitration as a speedy and relatively inexpensive
means of dispute resolution."3 7 Section 1281 of the California Code of Civil
Procedure states that "a written agreement to submit to arbitration an existing
controversy or a controversy thereafter arising is valid, enforceable and irrevocable,
save upon such grounds as exist for the revocation of any contract. 3 8 The statutes
also provide mechanisms for enforcing arbitration agreements; 39 rules for arbitration
proceedings; 40 provisions for vacating, correcting, confirming, and enforcing42
arbitration awards; 41 and guidelines for the judicial oversight of arbitration matters.
The California Supreme Court in Utah Construction Co. v. Western Pacific
Railway discussed the policy reasons for recognizing arbitration and enacting a
statutory scheme.43 The court in Utah Construction Co. said, "the policy of the law
in recognizing arbitration agreements and in providing by statute for their
enforcement is to encourage persons who wish to avoid delays incident to a civil
action to obtain an adjustment of their differences by a tribunal of their own
choosing."" The United States Supreme Court supported the rationale for statutory
arbitration guidelines by stating that these statutes serve as a good mechanism for
discouraging courts from overlooking the contractual relationship in the arbitration
process in favor of judicial discretion.45
Although arbitration is heavily governed by contract, it is still subject to limited
judicial review, especially in cases of final or binding awards. 46 The question of
whether arbitration awards should have the effect of nonmutual collateral estoppel
arises in these cases of limited judicial review. Many jurisdictions in the United
States have ruled that unless parties otherwise agree, private arbitration awards will
have nonmutual collateral estoppel effect if they are judicially confirmed.47
In Witkowski v. Welch,4 the Third Circuit Court of Appeals addressed the issue
of whether collateral estoppel was effective in barring a claim when an arbitrator had

35. Id. at 330.
36. Moncharsh v. Heily & Blase, 3 Cal. 4th 1, 9-10 (1992).
37. Ericksen, Arbuthnot, McCarthy, Kearney & Walsh, Inc. v. 100 Oak Street, 35 Cal. 3d. 312, 322
(1983).
38. CAL. CIV. PROC. CODE § 1281 (West 1999).
39. CAL. CIV. PROC. CODE §§ 1281.2-1281.95 (West 1999).
40. CAL. CIv. PROC. CODE §§ 1282-1284.2 (West 1999).
41. CAL. CIV. PROC. CODE §§ 1285-1288.8 (West 1999).
42. CAL. CIV. PROC. CODE §§ 1290-1294.2 (West 1999).
43. 174 Cal. 156, 159 (1916).
44. Id.
45. Dean Witter Reynolds Inc. v. Byrd, 470 U.S. 213, 219-21 (1985).
46. Moncharsh, 3 Cal. 4th at 9, 10.
47. Vandenberg, 982 P.2d at 240.
48. 73 F.3d 192 (3d Cir. 1999).
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dismissed the issue in question in the decision. The court stated that for collateral
estoppel to apply there must have been a final judgment on the merits of the issue.'
Applying federal and Pennsylvania law, the Third Circuit determined that
"arbitration proceedings and their findings are considered final judgments for the
purposes of applying collateral estoppel."51 In reaching its decision in the Witkowski
case, the court citied the Restatement (Second) of Judgments section 84 which states
that "a valid and final award by arbitration has the same effects under the rules of res
judicata,
subject to the same exceptions and qualifications, as a judgment of a
52
Court."

In Mandich v. Watters," the Eighth Circuit Court of Appeals applied Minnesota
law to determine whether a district court could apply collateral estoppel against a
party based on an arbitration decision. 4 Under Minnesota law, one of the elements
needed for collateral estoppel is a prior adjudication." The Mandich court
determined that arbitration was a prior adjudication under the collateral estoppel
criteria and, therefore, the district court properly applied collateral estoppel to the
issue decided in the private arbitration proceeding. 6
The Witkowski and Mandich decisions are typical of several federal and state
decisions giving collateral estoppel effect to private arbitration decisions.57 The
Vandenberg court acknowledged the prevailing view on this issue, but dismissed the
majority approach in its decision."'

IV. INSTANT DECISION
Contrary to most United States jurisdictions, the California Supreme Court held
in Vandenberg v. Superior Court 9 that arbitration awards only have the effect of
collateral estoppel if the parties agree to such an effect.60 In Vandenberg, the
California Supreme Court noted three main policy reasons other courts have offered
for applying collateral estoppel to arbitration decisions.61 First, the California
Supreme Court recognized a general policy preference among courts to avoid
relitigating issues and noted that applying collateral estoppel to arbitration decisions
can fulfill this policy goal.6 2 The court cited the New York Court of Appeals

49. Id.
50. Id. at 199.
51. Id.
52. Id. (quoting RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF JUDGMENTS § 84 (1982)).
53. 970 F.2d 462, 465 (8th Cir. 1992).
54. Id.
55. Id.
56. Id. at 466.
57. See Guaranty Nat'l. Ins. v. Williams, 982 P.2d 306 (Colo. 1999); Western Indus. Envtl. Servs. v.
Kaldveer Assocs., 887 P.2d 1048 (Idaho 1994); Aufderhar v. Data Dispatch, Inc., 452 N.W.2d 648
(Minn. 1990); Clemens v. Apple, 481 N.E.2d 560 (N.Y. 1985); Cities Service Co. v. Gulf Oil Corp., 980
P.2d 116 (Okla. 1999); Konieczny v. Micciche, 702 A.2d 831 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div. 1997).
58. Vandenberg, 982 P.2d at 241.
59. 982 P.2d 229.
60. Id. at 242-43.
61. Id. at 241.
62. Id.
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decision in American Insurance Co. v. Messinger as an instance where the decision
to preclude an issue against arbitration parties was justified by the court's interest in
preventing the relitigation of issues.63 Second, the Vandenberg court acknowledged
the argument that collateral estoppel does not cause any type of injustice when the
64
parties have had an opportunity to fully and fairly litigate the issue. Third, the
court recognized the argument by courts in other jurisdictions that "final" and
"binding" arbitration inherently implies the application of collateral estoppel because
judicially confirmed arbitration decisions are given the same force and effect as civil
judgments.6 ' The California Supreme Court cited the Witkowski decision as an
instance in which a court applied collateral estoppel because it determined an
arbitration award to be a final judgment under the provisions of the Federal
Arbitration Act.'
Despite the three rationales offered by other courts for upholding the application
of collateral estoppel to arbitration decisions, the California Supreme Court found
these justifications unpersuasive. 67 The court stated that the arguments favoring the
application of collateral estoppel to arbitration decisions disregard the "voluntary,
contractual, and informal nature of private arbitration, and the consequent reasonable
expectations of the arbitral parties. 6 8
The court further dismissed the application of collateral estoppel to private
arbitration decisions because private arbitration does not have -the same force and
effect as civil judgments under California law. 69 Based on Lucido v. Superior
Court,70 the Vandenberg court stated that collateral estoppel only applies under
' 71
Because the
California law if it "comports with fairness and sound public policy.
enabling arbitration statute does not warn that collateral estoppel may apply, the
court in Vandenberg concluded that the standard of "fairness and sound public
policy" is not reached.72
The court also stated that there should be no implied acceptance of a collateral
7
estoppel effect when parties submit to private arbitration. ' The court justified its
position by noting that arbitrators can base their decisions on the principles of justice
74
and equity, which may not have been admissible in a trial. The court also stated

63. Id. See Messinger,371 N.E.2d 798 (N.Y. 1977).
64. Vandenberg, 982 P.2d at 241.
65. Id.
66. Id. See Witkowski, 173 F.3d at 199-200.
67. Vandenberg, 982 P.2d at 241.
68. Id.
69. Id.
70. 795 P.2d 1223.
71. Vandenberg, 982 P.2d at 241.
72. Id. Section 1287.4 of the California Code of Civil Procedure, as amended in 1998, states the
following:
If [a private arbitration] award is confirmed, judgment shall be entered in conformity
therewith. The judgment so entered has the same force and effect as, and is subject to all
the provisions of law relating to, a judgment in a civil action of the same jurisdictional
classification; and it may be enforced like any other judgment of the court in which it is
entered, in an action of the same jurisdictional classification.
Id. (quoting CAL. Civ. PROC. CODE § 1287.4 (West 1998)).
73. Vandenberg, 982 P.2d at 242.
74. Id.
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that because the justifications made in arbitration decisions are not necessarily
75
disclosed, these decisions do not lend themselves to accurate judicial review.
a
greater
bear
would
Finally, the court noted that the party who lost the arbitration
burden and, thus, arbitration could be discouraged.76
Based on these arguments, the California Supreme Court in Vandenberg held:
"we adopt, for California purposes, tie rule that a private arbitration award cannot
77
have nonmutual collateral estoppel effect unless the arbitral parties so agree.
78
However, the court was not unanimous in this decision. In a lengthy concurring
and dissenting opinion, Justice Brown strongly opposed the rule that nonmutual
collateral estoppel only applies to judicially confirmed arbitration decisions when the
parties agree.79
Initially, Justice Brown disagreed with the majority's interpretation of section
1287.4 of the California Code of Civil Procedure. 0 Justice Brown concluded that
the statutory language was clear and unambiguously means that judicially confirmed
8
arbitration decisions should have the same effect as all other court judgments. '
Next, Justice Brown outlined three reasons why the majority's ruling on the
collateral estoppel issue was contrary to public policy. 2 First, he contended that by
not granting collateral estoppel to judicially confirmed rulings, the court was
promoting inconsistent decisions.8 3 Second, Justice Brown stated that it was illadvised to allow the parties to determine whether an arbitration proceeding will have
the effect of collateral estoppel because it may give judicial credence to proceedings
4
that lack "judicial character" and may, therefore, undermine judicial integrity.
Third, Justice Brown stated that the denial of collateral estoppel to judicially
confirmed arbitration will undermine judicial economy and cause a greater strain on
judicial resources.8 5 In dismissing the majority's concern that collateral estoppel will
make arbitration more like litigation, Justice Brown stated that the inherent
flexibility and simplicity of arbitration will always make it an attractive alternative
to litigation. 6
In a footnote to the majority opinion in Vandenberg, Justice Baxter addressed
the concerns of Justice Brown. 7 The majority stated that section 1281.2(c) of the
California Code of Civil Procedure gives courts the authority to ensure that private
88
arbitration does not unfairly infringe on the rights of the courts or third parties.

75.
76.
77.
78.
79.
80.
81.
82.
83.
84.
85.
86.
87.
88.

Id.
Id.
Id. at 242-43.
Id.at 246.
Id.
Id. See supra note 72.
Vandenberg, 982 P.2d at 246.
Id. at 247.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id. at 247-48.
Id. at 242.
Id. California Code of Civil Procedure section 1287.4 (West 1998) states:
A party to the arbitration agreement is also a party to a pending court action or special
proceeding with a third party, arising out of the same transaction or series of related
transactions and there is a possibility of conflicting rulings on a common issue of law or

Published by University of Missouri School of Law Scholarship Repository, 2000

7

Journal of Dispute Resolution, Vol. 2000, Iss. 2 [2000], Art. 13
[Vol. 2000, No. 2
JOURNAL OF DISPUTERESOLUTION
The majority also stated that parties are free to determine that an arbitration decision
will bind them in other related cases.89 Finally, the majority dismissed Justice
Brown's concerns as speculative and not warranting of an imposition of mandatory
collateral estoppel on parties to private arbitration.'
Therefore, based on the above stated rationales of the majority, the California
Supreme Court in Vandenberg adopted "the rule that a private arbitration award
cannot have nonmutual collateral estoppel effect unless the arbitral parties so
agree." 9' However, in a footnote by the majority, the court carefully outlined the
limitations to the scope and application of the decision. 92 The court stated that "[o]ur
holding is narrowly circumscribed." 93 First, the court narrowed its decision by
stating that the decision does not limit claim preclusion between parties in private
arbitration.94 Second, the court pointed out that Vandenberg does not address the
issue of whether collateral estoppel applies when the same parties in one arbitration
enter into subsequent litigation.9" Third, the court stated that its decision does not
consider any aspect of the Federal Arbitration Act.96 Fourth, the California Supreme
Court said that its decision did not consider the application of collateral estoppel to
arbitration awards under collective bargaining statutes. 97 Fifth, the court stated that
its decision does not cover the application of collateral estoppel to any arbitration
required under a specific California statute. 9

fact. For purposes of this section a pending court action or special proceeding includes an
action or proceeding initiated by the party refusing to arbitrate after the petition to compel
arbitration has been filed, but on or before the date of the hearing on the petition. This
subdivision shall not be applicable to an agreement to arbitrate disputes as to the
professional negligence of a health care provider made pursuant to Section 1295.
If the court determines that a written agreement to arbitrate a controversy exists, an order
to arbitrate such controversy may not be refused on the ground that the petitioner's
contentions lack substantive merit.
If the court determines that there are other issues between the petitioner and the
respondent which are not subject to arbitration and which are the subject of a pending
action or special proceeding between the petitioner and the respondent and that a
determination of such issues may make the arbitration unnecessary, the court may delay
its order to arbitrate until the determination of such other issues or until such earlier time
as the court specifies.
If the court determines that a party to the arbitration is also a party to litigation in a
pending court action or special proceeding with a third party as set forth under subdivision
(c) herein, the court (1) may refuse to enforce the arbitration agreement and may order
intervention or joinder of all parties in a single action or special proceeding; (2) may order
intervention or joinder as to all or only certain issues; (3) may order arbitration among the
parties who have agreed to arbitration and stay the pending court action or special
proceeding pending the outcome of the arbitration proceeding; or (4) may stay arbitration
pending the outcome of the court action or special proceeding.
CAL. CIV. PROC. CODE § 1287.4.
89. Vandenberg, 982 P.2d at 242.
90. Id.
91. Id. at 242-43.
92. Id. at 234 n.2.
93. Id.
94. Id.
95. Id.
96. Id.; 9 U.S.C. §§ 1-14 (1994).
97. Vandenberg, 982 P.2d at 234 n.2.
98. Id.
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V. COMMENT
The California Supreme Court's decision in Vandenberg, not to apply
nonmutual collateral estoppel to judicially confirmed arbitration awards, should be
scrutinized for three reasons. First, according to the concurring and dissenting
opinion, the majority completely ignored a California statute, which clearly and
unambiguously authorizes the application of nonmutual collateral estoppel in cases
of judicially confirmed arbitration awards. 99 Second, the majority offered several
limitations on the scope and application of its decision."° These limitations actually
serve as an admission by the court that valid reasons exist for allowing the
application of collateral estoppel to arbitration decisions in some instances. Third,
the court's decision on collateral estoppel contradicts a majority of jurisdictions,
federal civil procedure, scholarly opinion and the Restatement (Second) of
Judgments.' 0 '
A. Ambiguity
The minority's accusation in Vandenberg is that the majority disregards section
1287.4 of the California Code of Civil Procedure.'0 2 Writing for the minority, Justice
Brown asserted that the statute clearly and unambiguously grants a confirmed
arbitration award the same status as other civil court judgments.'0 3 Therefore, Justice
Brown concluded that a confirmed arbitration award unquestionably has the effect
of nonmutual collateral estoppel."°4 Justice Brown contended that the majority
overstepped its role and infringed on the autonomy of the legislative branch by
interpreting a statute that was neither unclear nor ambiguous.05 Justice Brown cited
Lungren v. Deukmejian to support his argument that the majority had no right to
interpret the statute.' °6 Lungren states that "[i]f the language is clear and
unambiguous there is no need for construction, nor is it necessary to resort to indicia
of the intent of the Legislature (in the case of a statute)... ,,'07 Furthermore, Justice
Brown cited People v. Garcia, which says "we [the Court] must limit ourselves to
interpreting the law as written and leave for the People and the Legislature the task
of revising it as they deem wise.' 0 8
Based on Justice Brown's recitation and interpretation of the law, it appears that
the majority in Vandenberg overstepped its authority and usurped the will of the
California legislature. The majority stated that section 1287.4 clearly authorizes that
confirmed arbitration awards be treated as any other judgments and admitted that

99. Vandenberg, 982 P.2d at 246 (Brown, J., dissenting).
100. Id. at 234 n.2.
101. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF JUDGMENTS § 84 (1982).
102. Vandenberg, 982 P.2d at 246 (Brown, J., dissenting). See supra note 72.
103. Vandenberg, 982 P.2d at 246.
104. Id.
105. Id.
106. Id. See Lungren v. Deukmejian, 755 P.2d 299 (Cal. 1988).
107. Lungren, 755 P.2d at 303-04.
108. 980 P.2d 829, 838 (Cal. 1999).
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judgments are to be given the effect of nonmutual collateral estoppel.' 09 However,
Justice Brown pointed out that the majority did not even provide a statutory analysis
of the language of section 1287.4 even though it quoted the statute." ° The majority
contended that it found fairness and public policy reasons for not applying collateral
estoppel to confirmed arbitration awards, but public policy is not a permissible basis
for interpreting a clear, unambiguous and constitutional statute."' Lungren and
Garciaestablished that a court can only offer its interpretation of a statute when the
meaning of the statute cannot be discerned, and nowhere do these decisions allow
for a court's notion of fairness and public policy to replace this standard. '12
B. A "Narrowly Circumscribed"Holding
An examination of the limitations and narrowing language placed on the
Vandenberg court's opinion is necessary because it raises the question of what
distinguishes these exceptions from the court's decision. First, the court noted that
its decision does not limit the application of strict res judicata or claim preclusion to
private arbitration awards." 3 The Court cited Thibodeau v. Crum and Sartor v.
Superior Court as instances in which res judicata would be appropriate for third
parties who were in privity with the prevailing party to the original arbitration
awards." 4 The court in Thibodeau justified the application of res judicata to an
unconfmned arbitration award based on the desire of the judiciary to avoid multistepped litigation processes." 5 The Sartor court stated that it was the policy of
California to give effect to arbitration decisions."16 As a result, the Sartor court
found that the application of collateral estoppel to a petitioner that was in privity
with the prevailing party in a judicially confirmed arbitration proceeding would
promote this policy." 7
By citing Thibodeau and Sartor,the Vandenberg court was trying to narrow the
scope of its decision by illustrating instances where res judicata would apply to
arbitration awards. However, the court has inadvertently undermined the credibility
of its own decision because Thibodeau and Sartor show a recognition and
acceptance by California courts of the application of res judicata to arbitration
awards. The next logical step in this line of cases would have been for the California
Supreme Court to apply nonmutual collateral estoppel in Vandenberg. Instead, the
court drew an arbitrary and illogical line at which the doctrine of res judicata would
no longer apply to arbitration decisions. The policy justifications of judicial
economy and the judicial effect to arbitration awards adopted in Thibodeau and
Sartor are just as valid and applicable in Vandenberg.

109. Vandenberg, 982 P.2d at 241.
110. Id. at 247.
111. Id. at 237-40.
112. Lungren, 755 P.2d at 303-04; Garcia,980 P.2d at 838.
113. Vandenberg, 982 P.2d at 234 n.2 ("Our holding is narrowly circumscribed.")
114. Id. See Thibodeau v. Crum, 6 Cal. Rptr. 2d 27 (Cal. Ct. App. 1992); Sartor v. Superior Court,
187 Cal. Rptr. 247 (Cal. Ct. App. 1982).
115. Thibodeau, 6 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 30.
116. Sartor, 187 Cal. Rptr. at 250.
117. Id.
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Second, the court stated that it does not "address the circumstances, if any, in
which a private arbitration award may have 'issue preclusive' effect in subsequent
litigation between the same parties on different causes of action.""' The court did
not elaborate on this statement, nor did it cite any case law that addresses this issue.
However, in Conner v. Dart Transportation Service,"9 the California Court of
Appeal held that findings in an employment related arbitration proceeding had the
effect of collateral estoppel in a subsequent suit for defamation and breach of
contract between the parties. 20
Third, the court stated that it has "no occasion to consider whether application
of the FAA [Federal Arbitration Act] would alter our ruling."'' However, under
federal law, arbitration awards are generally given the effect of nonmutual collateral
estoppel.'2 Therefore, the court points out yet another instance in which its decision
does not apply.
Fourth, the court noted that its decision does not affect collateral estoppel issues
related to arbitration awards associated with any type of collective bargaining
agreement under state or federal law.'23 The court cites Kelly v. Vons Cos. 24 and
Lehto v. Underground Construction Co.;12 5 both of these California state cases
support the notion that arbitration decisions will not have the effect of collateral
estoppel against third parties. 26 However, the majority's footnote also mentioned
federal collective bargaining agreements and as stated earlier, federal law does apply
nonmutual collateral estoppel to arbitration decisions.' 27
Fifth and finally, the court stated that its decision does not address whether
nonmutual collateral estoppel applies to arbitration conducted under a specific
California statutory scheme.' 28 In direct contrast to the holding in Vandenberg, the
California Court of Appeal held in State Farm Mutual Automobile Insurance Co. v.
Superior Court that statutorily mandated judicial arbitration can have the effect of
nonmutual collateral estoppel. 129 The determination by the Vandenberg court that
its holding does not apply to this type of arbitration conducted under a California
statutory scheme is the most glaring evidence that the court is having to contort itself
in order to avoid blatant inconsistency with its own decision. There is no logical
reason why arbitration mandated by statute should have any different effect than
voluntary arbitration permitted by statute and, unfortunately, the court does not
elaborate on this distinction except to offer another case in which collateral estoppel
was not applied under a statutorily mandated arbitration proceeding. 30

118. Vandenberg, 982 P.2d at 234 n.2.
119. 135 Cal. Rptr. 259 (Cal. Ct. App. 1976).
120. Id. at 261.
121. Vandenberg, 982 P.2d at 234 n.2.
122. See Witkowski v. Welch, 173 F.3d 192 (3d Cir. 1999). The federal law at issue in Witkowski
was the Employee Retirement Income Security Act, 29 U.S.C. §1001 (1994). Id. at 199.
123. Vandenberg, 982 P.2d at 234 n.2.
124. 79 Cal. Rptr. 2d 763 (Cal. Ct. App. 1998).
125. 138 Cal. Rptr. 419 (Cal. Ct. App. 1977).
126. Vandenberg, 982 P.2d at 234 n.2.
127. Witkowski, 173 F.3d at 206.
128. Vandenberg, 982 P.2d at 234 n.2.
129. 259 Cal. Rptr. 50 (Cal. Ct. App. 1989).
130. See Flynn v. Gorton, 255 Cal. Rptr. 768 (Cal. Ct. App. 1989).
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Combined, the preceding qualifications that define the court's "narrowly
circumscribed" holding tend to suggest that the exceptions should in fact state the
rule. In other words, by offering these limitations on its holding, one could infer that
the court should have decided the issue differently.
C. "ContraryApproach"
The most important reason for scrutinizing the Vandenberg court's opinion is
the fact that it contradicts prevailing opinion on the issue of applying nonmutual
collateral estoppel to judicially confirmed arbitration awards. The court stated that
"[w]e realize that some commentators and most other courts addressing the issue,
have taken a contrary approach. '13' The court noted that the predominant view is to
apply nonmutual collateral estoppel to judicially confirmed arbitration awards when
the parties sought to foreclose the issue and the parties had the incentive and
opportunity to litigate the matter." 2 The court then proceeded to cite a string of
cases which apply both state and federal law in contradicting its holding.'
Each case cited by the court offers similar justifications for the application of
nonmutual collateral estoppel to arbitration awards. In Clemens v. Apple, the Court
of Appeals of New York concluded that parties should be fully aware of the possible
outcomes and effects of an arbitration ruling due to the fact that it is strictly
voluntary.' Furthermore, the Clemens court noted that just like any civil case, the
parties to arbitration should reasonably assume that arbitration could impact outside
litigation."' This approach is opposite to Vandenberg,which assumes that it would
be unfair to make parties assume and take into account the effect arbitration will
have on outside litigation. In Clemens, the amount at issue in the arbitration was
approximately $1,800.00, while the amount at issue in a related lawsuit with a third
party was $250,000.00.36 The plaintiff lost on the issue in the arbitration and the
intermediate appellate court held that issue was precluded from the suit with the third
party.'37 Based on this scenario, the Vandenberg court would argue that since the
plaintiff had a relatively insignificant amount at stake in the arbitration, he might not
have expended his full resources in the arbitration proceeding. Therefore, the
California Supreme Court would consider it unfair to hold the plaintiff to a decision
where he may not have found it prudent to fully pursue his interest. If a party is truly
concerned that the potential risk is not worth the potential outcome of arbitration,
then they should not submit to voluntary arbitration. The New York approach also
promotes judicial economy. By applying issue preclusion to arbitration, parties are

131. Vandenberg, 982 P.2d at 240.
132. Id.
133. Id. See Witkowski v. Welch, 173 F.3d 192 (3d Cir. 1999); Mandich v. Watters, 970 F.2d 462
(8th Cir. 1992); Western Indus. Envtl. Servs. v. Kaldveer Assocs. 887 P.2d 1048 (Idaho 1994);
Aufderhar v. Data Dispatch, Inc., 452 N.W.2d 648 (Minn. 1990); Clemens v. Apple, 481 N.E.2d 560
(N.Y. 1985); Cities Service Co. v. Gulf Oil Corp., 980 P.2d 116 (Okla. 1999); Konieczny v. Micciche,
702 A.2d 831 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div. 1997).
134. Clemens, 481 N.E.2d at 561.
135. Id.
136. Clemens v. Apple, 477 N.Y.S.2d 774, 776 (N.Y. App. Div. 1984).
137. Id. at 776.

https://scholarship.law.missouri.edu/jdr/vol2000/iss2/13

12

2000]

Cromwell: Cromwell: Arbitration and Its Collateral
Arbitrationand Its CollateralEstoppel Effect on Third Parties

437

on notice that they must arbitrate their cases to the best of their ability if they are
truly concerned about claims by third parties on the same issue. This saves the
resources of the courts that must confirm arbitration decisions and of the courts that
would have to hear the issue if the arbitration was not preclusive.

VI. CONCLUSION
Collateral estoppel serves a valuable role in promoting the efficiency of our
legal system. To disallow application of this form of res judicata in judicially
confirmed arbitration burdens the courts without giving them the benefit of their own
prior decisions. When a judge confirms an arbitration award, he or she has spent the
court's valuable time determining whether a final ruling on the merits exists.
Therefore, this ruling should have the effect of any other judicial proceeding and
collateral estoppel should apply. The court in Vandenberg superceded the interests
of the parties over the interest of judicial economy. The only way this would be
justified is if judicial economy were inherently unfair but, by establishing a
consistent rule that informs parties of their collateral liability, no one could argue a
lack of fairness. However, by holding as it does in Vandenberg, California has
adopted a rule that is inconsistent with the rest of the country and has convoluted this
rule by applying narrowing language that will only create conflict and confusion.
THURSTON
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